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Abstract. In a scenario with a continuum of asymmetrically informed agents,
we analyze how the initial information of a trader may be altered when she
becomes a member of a coalition. In contrast to a perfect competition frame,
we first show that neither arbitrarily small coalitions nor large coalitions are
enough to block an allocation which is not in the core, due to the market fail-
ure produced by asymmetric information. However, under mild assumptions,
we extend the characterizations of the core provided by Vind and Schmeidler
(1972) to economies with asymmetrically informed traders. We then focus on
information sharing rules based on the coalitions’ size. Assuming the existence
of coalitions to which the sharing rule associates an information finer than all
the others, we show that the corresponding cores coincide with the one defined
by this finest information. Finally, characterizations for the weak fine, the fine
and the private core are obtained as particular cases of this equivalence theorem.
JEL Classification: D82, D51, D71, C02.
Keywords: Coalitions, asymmetric information, information sharing, blocking
mechanisms, core.
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1 Introduction
This paper focuses on the veto mechanism for economies with a continuum of asymmet-
rically informed agents that trade a finite number of commodities.
Asymmetries in information create market imperfections which are particularly rele-
vant to the rules that regulate the information sharing within coalitions. In this frame-
work the information that each trader initially possesses may vary when she becomes a
member of a group. For instance, this variation can occur as a result of an information
sharing process among traders belonging to the same coalition or, on the contrary, it
could be a consequence of some rules that prevent the use of information other than the
common one.
This aspect has been widely acknowledged by the literature and several alternative
notions of core have been proposed such as the fine, the coarse, and the private core.
In the fine core, introduced by Wilson (1978), traders in a coalition pool their initial
private information whereas in the coarse core, also introduced by Wilson (1978), traders
within each coalition only use their common information.
In the private core, defined by Yannelis (1991), the information of an individual is
not modified when a coalition is formed, that is, each member maintains her private
information independently of the coalition she belongs to.
In this paper we go a step further by focusing on the information changes that may
occur when a trader becomes member of a coalition. To this aim, we consider the notion
of information sharing rule introduced by Allen (2006) that allows for a great variety of
possibilities on trader’s information inside a coalition.
Firstly, we look at the measure of blocking coalitions when traders are asymmetri-
cally informed. We analyze the results by Schmeidler (1972) and Vind (1972), which are
interpreted as a characteristic of perfect competition. As the asymmetries in the infor-
mation produce market imperfections, we state examples which show that, in general,
these results do not hold in the framework of asymmetric information economies. Then,
under mild assumptions on the information sharing rule, we provide extensions of both
Schmeidler and Vind’s theorems for atomless economies with asymmetrically informed
agents.
In the classical core notions which have been addressed in the literature on economies
with asymmetric information (private, coarse and fine core), the rule used by a blocking
coalition, in regards to information sharing, is fixed a priori and is independent of any
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characteristic of the coalition itself. To overcome this limitation, we specify information
sharing rules such that in each coalition the capacity of its members to share or not
share their initial information is regulated on the size of the coalition.
This idea is initially developed in a general frame; we assume that in the market there
is a number of relevant sizes for the coalitions and an equivalent number of information
sharing rules. When a trader takes part in a coalition, she has access to a specific sharing
rule according to the size of the coalition itself. Whenever a class of coalitions is provided
with an information which is finer than all the others, we show that the resulting core
coincides with the one associated with this finest information sharing rule. We prove
this equivalence by using our extension of the Vind’s theorem.
We then detail the veto mechanism by analyzing particular and more explicit sharing
rules, following the traditional ways of modelling information within coalitions (common,
pooled and private information). We consider two mechanisms with a precise economical
meaning. In the first one, the process of information sharing may only take place within
coalitions with a size smaller than an exogenous threshold. It has a natural interpretation
if the transmission of information is costly; larger the size of the coalition more difficult
the communication among its members. Thus, only small coalitions pool information.
In contrast, in the second mechanism, traders pool information only in coalitions whose
measure is larger than another exogenous threshold. In this case, the intuition is that
members within big coalitions presume that their own information is irrelevant (the
probability of finding members with the same information is increasing with the size of
the group) and, consequently, they spontaneously share out their information. Under
the conditions which guarantee Vind’s result in an asymmetric information framework,
our main result states that the core solutions associated with these mechanisms are
equivalent and, depending on the informational requirement for an allocation to be
feasible, they coincide with either the weak fine core or the fine core.
The paper proceeds in the following order. In Section 2, we present the economic
model. In Section 3, we extend the core characterization by Schmeidler and Vind to
the framework of asymmetric information. In Section 4, the process of information
sharing within a coalition is regulated according to its measure. We then obtain an
equivalence result for the veto mechanisms depending on the information that coalitions
of a certain measure may acquire. In Section 5, we analyze information sharing rules that
use common, private or pooled information. We obtain the coincidence of the associated
cores as particular cases of the previous equivalence result.
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2 General set-up
2.1 Preliminary notations
Given a set Ω, a partition of Ω is a collection of nonempty, pairwise disjoint subsets,
often called blocks, whose union is Ω.
A binary relation  can be defined on the set P of all partitions of Ω as follows.
Given P,Q ∈ P , P is finer than Q (or, equivalently, Q is coarser than P ), denoted
P  Q, if for every A ∈ P there is B ∈ Q such that A ⊆ B.
The binary relation  is easily shown to be reflexive, transitive and antisymmetric, so
that (P ,) is a partially ordered set.
Moreover, (P ,) is a lattice where, for every P,Q ∈ P , the supremum P ∨ Q and the
infimum P ∧Q are defined as follows:
P ∨Q is the coarsest partition finer than both P and Q
P ∧Q is the finest partition coarser than both P and Q.
By denoting A(ω) the block in the partition A of Ω which contains ω, it holds that:
(P ∨Q)(ω) = P (ω) ∩Q(ω)
(P ∧Q)(ω) = {z ∈ Ω : z ∈ R(z1), z1 ∈ R(z2), ..., zk ∈ R(ω)},
where z1, . . . , zk ∈ Ω and R(ω) is either P (ω) or Q(ω).
The definitions above can be easily extended to a finite number of partitions.
2.2 The economic model
Let E be an exchange economy with asymmetric information and a continuum of traders
modelled by the finite measure space (I,A, µ), where I denotes the set of agents, A is
the Lebesgue σ-algebra and µ is the Lebesgue measure.
The economy extends over two time periods τ = 0, 1 and consumption takes place at
τ = 1. At τ = 0 there is uncertainty over the states of nature and agents make contracts
that may be contingent on the realized state of nature at period τ = 1, that is, trading is
characterized by ex ante contract arrangements. The exogenous uncertainty is described
by a measurable space (Ω,F), where Ω is a finite set of k states of nature and F denotes
the algebra of all events.
Agents are partially and asymmetrically informed with respect to states of nature.
Specifically, the initial information of trader t ∈ I is described by a measurable partition
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Πt of Ω. The interpretation is as follows: trader t is not able to distinguish the states of
nature which are in the same block of Πt and then if state ω¯ occurs, she only observes
the block of the partition Πt that contains such a state.
There is a finite number ` of commodities in each state and therefore (IR`+)
k is the
commodity space. Each agent t is characterized by her endowments e(t, ω) ∈ IR`+ for
each ω ∈ Ω and has a preference relation over the consumption set represented by the
utility function Ut : (IR
`
+)
k → IR+. The utility function Ut is said to be monotone if for
every x, y ∈ (IR`+)k such that x ≥ y, it holds that Ut(x) ≥ Ut(y).
An allocation f : I×Ω −→ IR`+ is physically feasible if
∫
I
f(t, ω)dµ(t) ≤
∫
I
e(t, ω)dµ(t)
for every ω ∈ Ω. In order to define the informational feasibility condition of an alloca-
tion, let us associate to each consumer t a partition Pt of Ω which may differ from the
initial information Πt. The interpretation is that during the trading process the infor-
mation that each agent initially possesses may vary; as a consequence, the constraint
that information imposes over allocations is expressed with reference to the partition Pt
rather than Πt.
The allocation f is feasible if it is physically feasible and f(t, ·) is Pt-measurable for
almost all t ∈ I.
For the sequel, it is also worth emphasizing the following points on how uncertainty
and information are modelled.
• As a consequence of Ω being finite, only a finite number, say n, of different parti-
tions of Ω exist. Let Πˆ1, Πˆ2, . . . , Πˆn denote these partitions.
• Given a coalition S ⊆ I, ∨t∈S Πt denotes the maximum information that coalition
S can dispose of, whenever each member of S opts for sharing her initial infor-
mation with everybody else within the coalition. Formally, this is the coarsest
refinement of each partition Πt, that is:
∨
t∈S
Πt =
{⋂
t∈S
Πt(ω) : ω ∈ Ω
}
where, following the notation stated before, Πt(ω) is the block in the partition Πt
which contains ω.
• ∧t∈S Πt is the common information partition associated to the coalition S. Thus,
A ∈ ∧t∈S Πt if and only if A is the smallest subset of Ω such that for every
ω ∈ A, Πt(ω) ⊆ A, for every t ∈ S.
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The first point is of particular interest for our purposes. In fact, regarding informa-
tion, we can identify only a finite number n of agents’ types, which are defined by:
Ii = {t ∈ I such that Πt = Πˆi}, i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n}.
We assume that, for every i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, the set Ii is measurable and µ(Ii) > 0.
For each coalition S ⊆ I, we can focus on the information types which are actually
present within such a coalition; they are represented by the following set:
IS = {i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n} : µ(S ∩ Ii) > 0}
Note that for every coalition S we have S =
⋃
i∈IS Si, where Si is the set of individuals
in S who, regarding information, are of type i, i.e., Si = {t ∈ S such that Πt = Πˆi}.
Using this notation, we have that Πˆi(ω) ∈
(∧
t∈S Πt
)⋂ (∨
t∈S Πt
)
for some i ∈ IS if
and only if Πˆi(ω) = Πt(ω) for every t ∈ S.
2.3 Information and coalitions
In this Section, we deal with the information that agents can dispose of when they
become members of a coalition and the associated blocking mechanism. In order to model
how the initial information of a trader changes, we use the notion of the information
sharing rule as introduced by Allen (2006).
Given a coalition S, an information sharing rule for S is a function Υ(S) which
associates a partition Υt(S) to each member t ∈ S; the partition Υt(S) is intended as
the information that agent t can dispose of once the coalition S has been formed. Thus,
an information sharing rule Υ for the economy E is a collection (Υ(S))S∈A.
Consider two information sharing rules Υ1 and Υ2; we say that Υ1 is finer than Υ2,
denoted by Υ1  Υ2, if for every S ⊆ I we have Υ1t (S)  Υ2t (S), for every t ∈ S.
Given an information sharing rule Υ, a coalition S Υ–blocks an allocation f via g if:
(i) For every t ∈ S, g(t, ·) is Υt(S)-measurable,
(ii)
∫
S
g(t, ω)dµ(t) ≤
∫
S
e(t, ω)dµ(t) for every ω ∈ Ω and
(iii) Ut(g(t, ·)) > Ut(f(t, ·)) for every t ∈ S.
The core of the economy E under the information sharing rule Υ, denoted by CΥ(E),
is the set of feasible allocations that are not Υ-blocked by any coalition.
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It is worth noting that different specifications of both, partitions Pt which appear in
the notion of feasibility, and the information sharing rule Υ, lead to well-known distinct
notions of core for asymmetric information economies (see Wilson, 1978, Yannelis, 1991
and Allen, 2006).
3 Asymmetric information and market imperfections
In every economic model where agents engage in cooperation, the formation of coalitions
could involve costs depending on the size or measure of the coalition itself. In this
respect, it becomes a topic of interest to characterize cooperative solutions in regards
to the blocking power of only those coalitions whose formation costs are not too high.
In an asymmetric information framework, this aspect requires an additional effort, since
trades may not only involve physical resources but also information. Therefore, the cost
related to the transmission of information could also be taken into account.
By addressing exchange economies with a finite number of commodities and a con-
tinuum of traders with complete information, Schmeidler (1972) shows that it is enough
to consider arbitrarily small coalitions in order to obtain the core. In the same issue
of Econometrica, Grodal (1972) and Vind (1972) complement the previous result char-
acterizing other families of coalitions which are able to block any allocation that does
not belong to the core. In the light of the core-Walras equivalence (see Aumann, 1964),
the results by Schmeidler, Grodal and Vind have been interpreted as a characterization
of perfect competition. In other words, we can assume that arbitrarily small coalitions
(Schmeidler and Grodal) or, symmetrically, arbitrarily big coalitions (Vind) are formed
with an arbitrarily low cost. These results heavily rely on Lyapunov’s convexity theo-
rem and, therefore, to keep this characterization of perfect competition in a more general
framework, as it is for instance an infinite dimensional setting, further assumptions are
required (see Herve´s-Beloso et al., 2000 and Evren and Hu¨sseinov, 2008).
Extensions to asymmetric information economies have been firstly obtained by Herve´s-
Beloso et al. (2005) and also by Evren and Hu¨sseinov (2008) and Pesce (2010). However,
in all these results traders maintain their initial information independently of the coali-
tion they belong to. In this Section our aim is to deepen the analysis when an exogenous
mechanism regulates the process of information sharing within coalitions.
In this asymmetric information framework imperfections of the market may arise and,
consequently, it should not be surprising that the above mentioned characterizations of
perfect competition do not hold. To show this point, we first state two examples which
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prove that Schmeidler’s and Grodal’s results and Vind’s result, respectively, may fail
without extra assumptions on the information sharing rule1.
Example 1. Consider an economy with asymmetric information, two possible states
of nature, a and b, and one commodity in each state. Every agent in [0, 1] has an initial
endowment given by (1, 1), that is, one unit of every commodity in each state. Let x
and y denote the consumption in a and b, respectively. Preferences are given by the
following utility functions:
Ut(x, y) =

x2y if t ∈ A = [0, 1/2)
xy2 if t ∈ B = [1/2, 1]
Agents in A have complete information whereas agents in B are not able to distinguish
the two states a and b, that is:
Πt =

{{a}, {b}} if t ∈ A
{a, b} if t ∈ B
We consider the information sharing rule Υ defined as follows:
Υt(S) =

∨
t∈S Πt if µ(S) > α∧
t∈S Πt if µ(S) ≤ α
Then, the initial endowment allocation is Υ–blocked by every coalition S with mea-
sure greater than α such that µ(S ∩ A) > 0 and µ(S ∩ B) > 0. However, it cannot be
Υ–blocked by any coalition S with µ(S) ≤ α.
Example 2. Consider the same economy as before except that preferences are given
by the following utility functions:
Ut(x, y) =

x2y if t ∈ [0, 1/4)
xy2 if t ∈ [1/4, 1/2)
xy if t ∈ [1/2, 1]
1The examples we state are in accordance with the work by Serrano et al. (2001) where it is shown
that the core convergence to competitive allocations, which is another perfect competition test, may
fail when the coarse blocking mechanism is considered.
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Then, the initial allocation is coarse blocked by the coalition [0, 1/2) via the allocation
which assigns (4/3, 2/3) to every agent in [0, 1/4) and (2/3, 4/3) to agents in [1/4, 1/2).
Note that the common information associated with any coalition S ⊂ [0, 1] such that
µ(S
⋂
[1/2, 1]) > 0 does not distinguish between a and b. Therefore, the initial allocation
cannot be blocked by any coalition with measure larger than 1/2 whenever the sharing
information rule is given by the coarse blocking structures.
In order to obtain a general version of both Schmeidler’s and Vind’s results in the
framework of asymmetric information economies, we will state several properties for the
information sharing rule Υ which we will use throughout this paper.
(P1) For every S, S ′ ∈ A such that S ′ ⊆ S and IS = IS′ , it holds that:
Υt(S
′) = Υt(S) for every t ∈ S ′
(P2) For every S, S ′ ∈ A such that S ′ ⊆ S and for every t ∈ S ′:
Υt(S)  Υt(S ′)
Property (P1) states that when trader t becomes part of two coalitions, one contained
in the other, the information she can dispose of in the smaller one is the same as the
information she can dispose of in the larger one whenever the information types included
in these two coalitions are the same. Property (P2) requires that if we consider an initial
coalition and additional members join this group, then, membership in the original
coalition cannot become worse off from an informational point of view. The information
sharing rules that satisfy (P2) are referred to as nested by Allen (2006) and, under this
property, she shows the non-emptiness of the core for NTU games with a finite number
of players and asymmetric information.
We remark that properties (P1) and (P2) together can be written as follows:
(P3) For every S, S ′ ∈ A with S ′ ⊆ S and for every t ∈ S ′, it holds that:
Υt(S)  Υt(S ′) if IS′ ⊂ IS;
Υt(S) = Υt(S
′) if IS = IS′
Note that properties (P1) and (P2) trivially hold for the private information sharing
rule Υpt , given by Υ
p
t (S) = Πt, for every S ∈ A and for every t ∈ S.
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Furthermore, (P1) holds for any sharing rule Υ with Υ(S) depending only on the
informational types IS, which are actually present in coalition S. This is particularly the
case for the fine information sharing rule, where agents share information within every
coalition. It is also the case for the coarse information sharing rule, where agents within
a group are restricted to use the common information. In addition, if the information
that any agent can dispose of within a coalition does not decrease when the number of
types increases2, then property (P3) is satisfied.
We also consider the next condition which states that the requirements for an al-
location f to be informationally feasible imply that, for every t, the bundle f(t, ·) is
compatible with the information that the individual t disposes of when the large coali-
tion is formed.
(P4) For every t ∈ I, Υt(I)  Pt.
Next we state an extension of Schmeidler’s result (1972) for asymmetric information
economies under an information sharing rule Υ which satisfies the property (P1).
Starting from a blocking coalition S, a crucial point in the proof is that an arbitrarily
small blocking coalition can be built in such a way that it contains the same informational
types as S. This fact, together with property (P1), makes it possible to overcome the
informational constraints over the blocking allocation.
Theorem 3.1 Consider the asymmetric information economy E and an information
sharing rule Υ with property (P1). Let f be an allocation which is Υ-blocked via g by a
coalition S. Then, for any ε ∈ (0, 1] there exists a coalition Sε ⊆ S with ISε = IS and
µ(Sε) = εµ(S) which also Υ-blocks f via the same g.
Proof. Let S be a coalition that Υ-blocks f under the information sharing rule Υ. That
is, there exists an allocation g such that:
(i) g(t, ·) is Υt(S)− measurable µ− a.e. in S,
(ii)
∫
S
g(t, ·)dµ(t) ≤
∫
S
e(t, ·)dµ(t) and
(iii) Ut(g(t, ·)) > Ut(f(t, ·))µ− a.e. in S.
2This occurs, for example, when agents share their information; on the contrary, it no longer occurs
when agents forming a coalition are restricted to use their common information.
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For each Si = {t ∈ S : Υt(S) = Πˆi} let us define the vectorial measure m by m(A) =(∫
A
(g(t, ·)− e(t, ·)) dµ(t), µ(A)
)
for every A ⊆ Si. Applying Lyapunov’s theorem, for
any ε ∈ (0, 1) there exists S ′i ⊆ Si such thatm(S ′i) =
(
ε
∫
Si
(g(t, ·)− e(t, ·))dµ(t), εµ(Si)
)
.
Let us consider the coalition Sε =
⋃
i∈IS S
′
i. Since the subcoalitions S
′
i are disjoint we
have m(Sε) =
∑
i∈J m(S
′
i). Therefore, we can conclude that:
•
∫
Sε
(g(t, ·)− e(t, ·))dµ(t) = ε
∑
i∈IS
∫
Si
(g(t, ·)− e(t, ·))dµ(t) ≤ 0;
• µ(Sε) =
∑
i∈IS
µ(S ′i) = εµ(S);
• g(t, ·) is Υt(S) - measurable, by virtue of property (P1).
That is, coalition Sε Υ-blocks f via g.
Q.E.D.
The previous remarks regarding property (P1) allows us to apply the extension of
Schmeidler’s result to allocations which do not belong to either private, fine or coarse
core.
We now turn to the blocking power of large coalitions by providing an extension of
the above mentioned Vind’s result to asymmetric information economies.
Theorem 3.2 Consider the asymmetric information economy E and an information
sharing rule Υ with properties (P3) and (P4). Suppose that utility functions Ut are
continuous and monotone. Let f be an allocation which is Υ-blocked via g by a coalition
S. Then, for any α ∈ (0, 1) there exists a coalition Sα with µ(Sα) = α which also
Υ-blocks f.
Proof. Let S be a coalition that blocks f under the information sharing rule Υ. That
is, there exists an allocation g such that:
(i) g(t, ·) is Υt(S) - measurable µ− a.e. in S,
(ii)
∫
S
g(t, ·)dµ(t) ≤
∫
S
e(t, ·)dµ(t) and
(iii) Ut(g(t, ·)) > Ut(f(t, ·))µ− a.e. in S.
12
Since (P3) implies (P1), we can apply Theorem 3.1, and therefore consider that S is
small enough so that µ(S) < mini µ(Ii).
Let us define H(t) = Ut(g(t, ·)− Ut(f(t, ·). Lusin’s theorem guarantees the existence
of a compact set K ⊂ S, with µ(K) > 0, such that H, f and g are continuous func-
tions on K. Consider the sequence of functions gn given by gn(t, ·) = nn+1g(t, ·) and let
Hn(t) = Ut(gn(t, ·)) − Ut(f(t, ·)). Note that gn(t, ·) ≤ gn+1(t, ·) for all n and t. Then
by monotonicity of preferences we have that Hn is a monotone increasing sequence of
continuous functions defined on K with pointwise limit H. Applying Dini’s theorem, we
know that there exists n such that Ut(gn(t, ·)) > Ut(f(t, ·)) for every n ≥ n and every
t ∈ K. Take any N > n and consider the allocation ĝ given by
ĝ(t, ·) =

N
N+1
g(t, ·) if t ∈ K
g(t, ·) if t ∈ S \K
By construction we have
∫
S
ĝ(t, ·)dµ(t) + δ ≤
∫
S
e(t, ·)dµ(t), for some δ  0.
Let ε ∈ (0, 1). Applying Lyapunov Theorem we obtain that there exists Sε ⊂ S such
that
∫
Sε
ĝ(t, ·)dµ(t) = ε
∫
S
ĝ(t, ·)dµ(t) and
∫
Sε
f(t, ·)dµ(t) = ε
∫
S
f(t, ·)dµ(t). Let h be the
allocation given by
h(t, ·) =
 ĝ(t, ·) if t ∈ Sεf(t, ·) + εδ
2µ(S\Sε) if t ∈ S \ Sε
Note that Ut(h(t, ·)) > Ut(f(t, ·)) for every t ∈ S. Moreover:∫
S
h(t, ·)dµ(t) =
∫
S
(εĝ(t, ·) + (1− ε)f(t, ·)) dµ(t) + εδ
2
By applying Lyapunov’s Theorem once more, there exists A ⊂ I \ S such that µ(A) =
(1− ε)µ(I \ S) and
∫
A
(f(t, ·)− e(t, ·)) dµ(t) = (1− ε)
∫
I\S
(f(t, ·)− e(t, ·)) dµ(t).
Now, let  be small enough so that µ(S
⋃
A) > µ(I) − mini µ(Ii). This guarantees
that the coalition B = S
⋃
A verifies that µ(B
⋂
Ii) = µ(Bi) > 0 for every i = 1, . . . , n
which implies IB = {1, . . . , n} = II . Then, since (P1) is implied by (P3), we have that
Υt(B) = Υt(I) for every t ∈ B.
Consider the allocation z defined by
z(t, ·) =
 h(t, ·) if t ∈ Sf(t, ·) + εδ
2µ(B)
if t ∈ A
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As mentioned above, by monotonicity of preferences Ut(z(t, ·)) > Ut(f(t, ·)) for every
t ∈ B. Additionally, properties (P3) and (P4) allow us to ensure that z(t, ·) is Υt(S)
- measurable for every t ∈ B. More precisely, condition (P2), which is implied by
(P3), guarantees that z(t, ·) is Υt(S) - measurable for every t ∈ S, whereas (P4)
leads us to confirm that z(t, ·) is Υt(S) - measurable for every t ∈ B \ S. Finally,∫
B
(z(t, ·)− e(t, ·)) dµ(t) ≤ 0.
Therefore, we have constructed an arbitrarily large coalition B. By using Theorem
3.1 once again, we conclude the proof.
Q.E.D.
4 Information and coalitions’ size
In this Section we aim at specifying a general rule where the information sharing among
traders is regulated on the size of the coalition they belong to.
For this purpose, we consider a partition (Mj, j ∈ J) of the interval M = [0, µ(I)],
where I is the set of agents and a collection F of information sharing rules indexed by
the same set J , that is, F = (Υj, j ∈ J).
We define a new information sharing rule Υ, such that the information that each agent
can dispose of when she becomes a member of a coalition S, that is Υt(S), depends on
the size of the coalition itself through the sets Mj. Precisely, we define Υ as follows.
Given a coalition S ⊆ I, let j be the index in J such that µ(S) ∈Mj; then:
Υt(S) = Υ
j
t(S) , for each t ∈ S. (1)
The intuition behind this setup is the following: in the market there are some relevant
sizes for the coalitions identified by the sets (Mj)j∈J . When trader t takes part in
coalition S, she has access to specific information given by a sharing rule according to
the size of the coalition S itself.
We state the following assumption on the collection F :
(F) There exists an index o ∈ J such that Υo  Υj for every j ∈ J and Υo satisfies
properties (P3) and (P4).
The following equivalence result holds:
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Theorem 4.1 Consider the asymmetric information economy E and suppose that the
information sharing rule Υ defined by (1) satisfies assumption (F). Then, the Υ-core
coincides with the Υo-core, that is, CΥ(E) = CΥo(E).
Proof. It is easy to see that CΥo(E) ⊆ CΥ(E). To prove this, let f be Υ-blocked by a
coalition S ⊆ I via allocation g. Since Υo is finer than any Υj in the collection F , it
holds that g(t, ·) is Υot (S)-measurable, for every t ∈ S. Then f is Υo-blocked by the
coalition S via the same allocation g.
To prove that CΥ(E) ⊆ CΥo(E) assume that f does not belong to CΥo(E). Hence,
there exists a coalition S and an allocation g : S × Ω −→ IR`+ such that:
(i) for every t ∈ S, g(t, ·) is Υot (S)-measurable,
(ii)
∫
S
g(t, ω)dµ(t) ≤
∫
S
e(t, ω)dµ(t) for every ω ∈ Ω and
(iii) Ut(g(t, ·)) > Ut(f(t, ·)) for every t ∈ S.
Let k ∈ J such that µ(S) ∈ Mk. If k = o, the proof ends. If k 6= o, by making use of
Theorem 3.2, we can find a coalition S˜, with µ(S˜) ∈Mo, which Υo-blocks f.
Q.E.D.
5 A new characterization for the fine core
Based on the general idea stated in the previous section, we now analyze two specific
blocking systems defined by using the traditional ways to share information, which are
common, pool and private information. In the first one, the process of information shar-
ing can only take place within coalitions with sizes smaller than an exogenous threshold,
whereas traders in the remainder of coalitions keep their initial information or use com-
mon information. On the other hand, in the second one, traders only pool their initial
information in coalitions whose size is larger than an exogenous threshold.
Both mechanisms make sense from an economic point of view. The first model has a
natural interpretation in a frame where the process of information transmission within
groups of individuals is costly: the larger the coalition is, the more difficult the commu-
nication among its components will be. In this perspective, it can be argued that the
cost of communication inside a coalition depend on its size and is lower for small coali-
tions than for larger ones. The same mechanism can be also interpreted in a different
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perspective: when a coalition is large enough, it is likely that each member may not have
the incentive to reveal her private information, adopting a selfish behavior which results
in a situation where all members of the coalition only share common information.
Symmetrically, the second mechanism formalizes the intuition that, when agents join
a big coalition, they presume that their own information is known (as the probability
of finding members with the same or more information is increasing with the size of the
group) and, consequently, they spontaneously share out.
In order to formally define the two mechanisms described above, we start by consid-
ering the partition of the set M = [0, µ(I)] formed by the intervals M1 = [0, s),M2 =
[s, b],M3 = (b, µ(I)], where s, b ∈ [0, µ(I)], and s < b.
We associate with this partition a collection F = (Υj, j ∈ {1, 2, 3}) of three informa-
tion sharing rules, defined for every S ∈ A and every t ∈ S as follows:
Υ1t (S) =
∨
t∈S Πt,
Υ2t (S) = Πt,
Υ3t (S) =
∧
t∈S Πt,
That is, Υ1, Υ2 and Υ3 are the fine, private and coarse information sharing rules,
respectively.
Note that assumption (F) holds for the collection F .
Starting from the partition (Mj, j ∈ {1, 2, 3}) and the collection F , we construct the
information sharing rules Υ1 and Υ2 defined by:
Υ1t (S) =

∨
t∈S Πt if µ(S) < s
Πt if µ(S) ∈ [s, b]∧
t∈S Πt if µ(S) > b
(2)
Υ2t (S) =

∧
t∈S Πt if µ(S) < s
Πt if µ(S) ∈ [s, b]∨
t∈S Πt if µ(S) > b
(3)
We state the following equivalence result which provides a new characterization for the
notion of fine and weak fine core (depending on the requirements to be an informationally
feasible allocation). We omit the proof since it is an immediate consequence of Theorem
4.1 and of the definitions of fine and weak fine core.
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Proposition 5.1 Consider the asymmetric information economy E and the information
sharing rules Υ1 and Υ2 defined by (2) and (3). It holds that:
CΥ1(E) = CΥ2(E)
Moreover, when Pt = Πt (Pt =
∨
t∈I Πt, respectively) for almost every t ∈ I, both the
notions coincide with the fine core (weak fine core, respectively).
We remark that the previous characterization means that we only need that traders
within a family of coalitions pool their information in order to obtain the fine core. An
analogous proposition could be stated to characterize the private core by requiring that
the information associated to a given family of coalitions is the initial information for
each of their members whereas agents within the remaining coalitions use any coarser
information.
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